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Abstract 
 
Derivative misconduct (also referred to as residual misconduct) refers to as a situation where an employee possesses 
information that would enable an employer to identify wrongdoers. When the employee fails to come forward when asked to do 
so, they violate the trust upon which the employment relationship is founded and may justify dismissal. Substantive fairness 
has to do with the reason of the dismissal. The underlying principle of substantive fairness is that the sanction meted out to the 
employee must be commensurate with the misconduct of such employee. The approach involved a derived justification, 
stemming from an employee’s failure to offer reasonable assistance in the detection of those actually responsible for the 
misconduct. The justification is wide enough to encompass also those innocent of it, and make themselves guilty of a derivative 
violation of trust and confidence. Justice must not only be done but it must be seen to be done. 
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1. Introduction and Background  
 
A fair and constructive approach to the management of the conduct and performance of employees can contribute 
towards a harmonious working environment. Discipline management should be based on clear and known standards and 
a progressive correction of transgression. Misconduct is one of the grounds recognised by the law that may give reason 
for the dismissal of an employee. The law promotes the principle of progressive discipline. 
Whilst the efficiency of the business operation is recognised as primary, disciplinary action should at the time be for 
a valid reason (substantive fairness), in accordance with fair procedure (procedural fairness). The dismissal should be 
effected in a procedurally fair manner. 
Derivative misconduct (also referred to as residual misconduct) refers to as a situation where an employee 
possesses information that would enable an employer to identify wrongdoers. When the employee fails to come forward 
when asked to do so, they violate the trust upon which the employment relationship is founded. Derivative misconduct 
may justify dismissal  
The principle of “derivative” misconduct or “residual” misconduct was first formulated in the Labour Appeal Court 
decisions of FAWU & others v Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd (1994)15 ILJ 1057 (LAC) as the arbitrator stated 
“employee’s silence justifies an inference that he participated or supported the particular misconduct that he had failed to 
disclose to his employer”. The employee has a duty of good faith to report for example theft, even if he/she was not 
directly involved therein. An employee’s failure to disclose information that would assist the employer’s investigation 
amounted to derivative misconduct. 
In cases where derivative misconduct is alleged, an employer must show that the employee knew or could have 
acquired knowledge of the misconduct and that the employee unreasonably failed to disclose this knowledge to the 
employer. 
An employee’s uncommunicativeness in disclosing helpful information may lead to the interference that the 
employee has something to be justified in instituting disciplinary proceedings derived from an employee’s failure to offer 
reasonable assistance in detecting those actually responsible for misconduct and through his silence make himself guilty 
of a derivative violation of trust and confidence. 
 
2. Substantive Fairness 
 
Section 192 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) read with s 188(1)(a)(i) thereof, places the onus in the court 
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of the employer to show that it complied with the rationale of substantive fairness. Section 188(1)(A)(i) of the LRA 
compels a commissioner to ensure that an employer dismissed an employee fairly and in doing so, for him or her, in 
terms of section 188(2) of the LRA to “take into account any relevant code of good practice” in terms of this Act. 
In Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice sets out the guidelines for employers to follow when dismissing an 
employee for misconduct. In terms of item 7 of schedule 8 of the LRA the employer is required to show: 
• That the employee contravened a rule or standard (derivative misconduct); 
• That the rule or standard was valid and reasonable; 
• That the employee knew or should have known the rule or standard; 
• That the rule or standard was applied consistently, and  
• That dismissal was fair and an appropriate sanction. 
An employee cannot be dismissed on mere “suspicious” of dishonestly. 
 
3. Case Law of Derivative Misconduct 
 
3.1 Chauke and Others v Lee Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors 
 
In Chauke and Others v Lee Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors (1998)19 ILJ 1441 (LAC) refers to as a situation 
where an employee possessed information that would enable an employer to identify wrongdoers. The case presents a 
difficult problem of fair employment practice. When the employee fails to come forward when asked to do so, they violate 
the trust upon which the employment relationship is founded. Derivative or residual misconduct may justify dismissal in 
appropriate circumstances. Through silence an employer could make themselves guilty of a derivative violation of trust 
and confidence. Even in common law, conduct inconsistent with that essential of trust and confidence warranted 
termination of employment (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen 1996 17 ILR 18(A). This approach 
involved a derived justification, stemming from an employee’s failure to offer reasonable assistance in the detection of 
those actually responsible for the misconduct. 
 
3.2 NUM AND Others/RSA Geological Services, a division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited 
 
The question to ask is which prerequisites must be met before an employer will be able to prove that an employee is 
guilty of derivative misconduct. And what are the consequences. The prerequisites for derivative misconduct were clearly 
articulated by the arbitrator in NUM and Others/RSA Geological Services, a division of De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Limited [2004] 1 BALR. First that the employee knew or could have acquired knowledge of the wrongdoing; second that 
the employee failed without justification to disclose that knowledge to the employer, or to take reasonable steps to help 
the employer acquire that knowledge. This approach involved a derived justification, stemming from an employee’s failure 
to offer reasonable assistance in the detection of those actually responsible for the misconduct. Though the dismissal is 
designed to target the perpetrators of the original misconduct, the justification is wide enough to encompass those 
innocent of it, but who through their silence make themselves guilty of a derivative violation of trust and confidence. The 
arbitrator accepted that the respondent act on a balance of probabilities.  
This particular form of misconduct “has at its very core and essence that the employee’s silence justifies an 
inference that he participated or supported the particular misconduct that he had failed to disclose to the employer.” The 
requirements for this form of misconduct have been described as twofold. First, that the employee knew or reasonably 
could have acquired knowledge of the wrongdoing; second, that the employee failed without justification to disclose that 
knowledge to the employer, or take reasonable steps to help the employer acquire that knowledge. In this matter the 
Commissioner held that the Employee tried to protect the consultant when she did not report the theft for a period of 3 
days but only after the shortage in the float had been discovered. This conduct on the employee’s part displays an 
intention to withhold the information from the regional manager to whom she should report. The fact that this happened in 
the financial industry was regarded as an aggravating factor. AS the trust relationship between the parties had been 
severely tarnished, the dismissal was held to have been fair and the application was dismissed. 
 
3.3 Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union (EPPWAWU) obo Hlebela v Lonmin Precious 
Metals Refinery 
 
In Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union (EPPWAWU) obo Hlebela v Lonmin Precious Metals 
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Refinery, the CCMA found that an employee's failure to disclose information that would assist the employer's 
investigation regarding its loss of approximately 200kg of platinum per month amounted to derivative misconduct. The 
applicant was employed as an “operator” in the respondent’s platinum processing enterprise at a monthly remuneration of 
approximately R14, 000.00 when dismissed for an alleged loss of trust on Tuesday, 17 August 2011 (see Item 2 of Part B 
of form LRA 7.11). In this case, having being alerted to the fact that some of its employees live extravagant lifestyles; the 
employer initiated a lifestyle audit and found that Mr Hlebela was leading an extravagant lifestyle that he would not have 
been able to maintain on his salary. The employer concluded that Mr Hlebela was somehow involved in the theft of its 
precious metals. The employer requested that Mr Hlebela make full disclosure of his assets but he refused to do so. He 
was therefore charged with having knowledge of the loss of precious metals but not disclosing information that could 
assist the employer in its investigations into the loss. Mr Hlebela via CEPPWAWU, on 1 September 2010, declared a 
dispute at the CCMA in Ekurhuleni alleging an unfair dismissal for which he sought retrospective reinstatement with full 
back-pay as relief. 
In cases where derivative misconduct is alleged, an employer must show that the employee knew or could have 
acquired knowledge of the misconduct and that the employee unreasonably failed to disclose this knowledge to the 
employer. The Commissioner referred to literature on the topic which found that the dishonesty can include inter alia 
withholding information from the employer. The Commissioner therefore held that the employer's request for disclosure 
was eminently reasonable and that Mr Hlebela's silence justified an inference that he participated or supported the loss of 
the metals. Accordingly, his failure to disclose the requested information following the lifestyle audit amounted to 
derivative misconduct and his dismissal was found to be fair. 
Evident from this case, in instances where there is no evidence against any specific employee, derivative 
misconduct may become relevant. An employee's reticence in disclosing helpful information may lead to the inference 
that the employee has something to hide. Therefore, an employer may be justified in instituting disciplinary proceedings 
derived from an employee's failure to offer reasonable assistance in detecting those actually responsible for misconduct 
and through his silence make himself guilty of a derivative violation of trust and confidence. 
The issue to be decided was whether the dismissal of the applicant, Mr Arnold Hlebela, was procedurally and 
substantively fair as provided for in terms of s185(a) of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”), read with 
s188(1)(a)(i), s188(1)(b) and s188(2) thereof. If not, the arbitrator was to then apply his mind to the relief sought by Mr 
Hlebela. 
As regards the survey of evidence and argument, the commissioner reflected on charge 2, as reflected on p 115 in 
exhibit 1, for which Mr Hlebela was found guilty and dismissed. It read as follows: “It is alleged that you have knowledge 
of the enormous losses of PGMs (‘Platinum Group metals’ — commissioner’s insert) at PMR (‘Precious Metal Refinery’ – 
commissioner’s insert), but you have made no full and frank disclosure to PMR about what could assist PMR in its 
investigations herein.” 
The guilty finding on this charge must be read with p 117 in exhibit 1 whereby the applicant, after a lifestyle audit 
which purportedly showed a way of life vastly higher than someone who earned R14, 000.00 per month, was requested 
to make certain disclosures in his private life to his employer to justify/clarify such a purportedly extravagant way of life. 
These included vehicle transactions for 24 months and details of the applicant’s immovable assets, such as 
houses, flats, townhouses and so forth. 
The respondent also sought disclosure on any private company or close corporations and, finally, a list of any 
valuable items purchased in the last 24 months such as designer clothing and jewellery. 
It is further common cause that the applicant, on the advice of his trade union, declined this invitation and that he 
was eventually dismissed for what is referred to in labour law as “derivative misconduct”, which simply means that Mr 
Hlebela, on a balance of probabilities, must have known how these vast quantities of precious metals were being pilfered 
from his employer.  
 
4. Substantive Fairness 
 
It is generally accepted that the employer need only prove the commission of the offence on a balance of probabilities 
(Grogan; 2001). Substantive fairness has to do with the reason of the dismissal. The underlying principle of substantive 
fairness is that the sanction meted out to the employee must be commensurate with the misconduct of such employee 
(Grossett; 2002). Mr Hlebela’s dismissal was effected for a fair reason. 
Insofar as substantive fairness is concerned, the “Code of Good Practice: Dismissal” as contained in Schedule 8 to 
the LRA sets out the guidelines for employers to follow when dismissing employees for misconduct. There must be a 
valid reason for the termination of the contract of employment. 
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In terms of Item 7 of Schedule 8 the employer is required to show that: 
• the employee contravened a rule or standard;  
• the rule or standard was valid and reasonable; 
• the employee knew or should have known the rule or standard;  
• the rule or standard was applied consistently; and  
• dismissal was a fair and appropriate sanction.  
An employee cannot be dismissed on mere “suspicions” of dishonesty. Offences should be judged on their merits 
and the employer should take into account the nature of the job and the circumstances surrounding the offence itself. 
However, in this particular matter of Mr Hlebela, strong and convincing circumstantial evidence was presented that Mr 
Hlebela was probably guilty as charged. 
 
5. Circumstantial Evidence 
 
At p 21 in Principles of Evidence, Swikkard and Others, 2nd edit 2002, Van der Merwe SE had this to say on 
circumstantial evidence, such as that presented before the arbitrator against Mr Hlebela: 
 
“Circumstantial evidence often forms an important component of the information furnished to the court (or CCMA 
commissioner). In these instances the court (or CCMA commissioner) is required to draw inferences, because the 
witnesses have made no direct assertions with regards to the fact in issue. These inferences must comply with certain 
rules of logic. Circumstantial evidence furnishes indirect proof ... 
 
Circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker than direct evidence. In some instances it may even be of more value 
than direct evidence … In civil proceedings the inference sought to be drawn must also be consistent with the proved 
facts, but it need not be the only reasonable inference: it is sufficient if it is the most probable inference (see S v Cooper 
1976 2 SA 732 (N) 734 and MacLeod v Rens 1997 3 SA 1039 (E))”. 
 
In S v Reddy 1996 2 SACR 1 (A) at 8i, Zulman AJA quoted from ‘Best on Evidence’ (10 ed) paragraph 297 as 
follows: 
 
“Even two articles of circumstantial evidence, though each taken by it weigh as much as a feather, join them together, 
you will find them pressing on the delinquent with the weight of a mill stone.” 
 
This really appropriate quote from Zulman AJA was time after time in fact “being solidified” and “brought to life” 
right before the very eyes of the arbitrator. 
The respondent’s representative would again and again direct Mr Hlebela to some of the expensive properties in 
exhibit 1, request some sort of an explanation, and the applicant would refuse to answer pleading his constitutional right 
to privacy as advised by CEPPWAWU or evade or not answer at all. 
Eventually, as reflected above, the pressure of the cross-examination undoubtedly just got too much for Mr Hlebela 
who eventually conceded that he owned, amongst others, a construction company. 
It needs to be reflected in this award that Mr Hlebela, on the advice of CEPPWAWU, as he certainly was 
constitutionally entitled to, insisted on having all questions put to him firstly in Tsonga and then, after carefully listening, 
he would respond in Tsonga. 
Ngcamu AJ, in Aluminium City (Pty) Ltd v MEIBC and Others (2006) 27 ILJ 2567 (LC), reviewed and set aside an 
arbitration award where an arbitrator adopted an erroneous approach to circumstantial evidence. 
The learned judge made it clear that once an employer established a prima facie case of misconduct (as in this 
case before the arbitrator) that the onus shifted to the employee to provide a credible explanation – which Mr Hlebela 
could not supply the arbitrator with. 
 
6. Bare Denial 
 
Mr Hlebela’s case was essentially throughout this arbitration one of a bare denial – and occasionally hiding behind the SA 
Constitution, if even that. 
Revelas J commented on the implications of a “bare denial” as an applicant’s “defence” in the unpublished matter 
under case number JR 1046/02 in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others as follows at [13]: 
 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 7 
May  2014 
          
 96 
“[13] It does not lie in the mouth of a party who denies misconduct, to derive any benefit from the version which proves 
her denial to be false … 
[144] … Unfortunately she chose to deny the incident. Sadly, it happens so often that misconduct is falsely denied, 
which only further compounds the breach of trust of the employer in the employee …” 
 
7. Derivative Misconduct 
 
In assessing the merits of the case before him, the arbitrator could come to no other conclusion than that the matter 
before him constituted a classic example of “derivative misconduct”. 
This particular form of misconduct was first suggested by the labour appeal court in FAWU v Amalgamated 
Beverage Industries (1994) 15 ILJ 1057 (LAC) and has, as the arbitrator stated above, at its very core and essence that 
the: “employee’s silence justifies an inference that he participated or supported the particular misconduct that he had 
failed to disclose to his employer.” 
In Chauke and Others v Lee Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors (1998) 19 ILJ 1441 (LAC), the court with 
approval noted that: 
“This approach involved a derived justification, stemming from an employee’s failure to offer reasonable assistance 
in the detection of those actually responsible for the misconduct. Though the dismissal is designed to target the 
perpetrators of the original misconduct, the justification is wide enough to encompass those innocent of it, but who 
through their silence make themselves guilty of a derivative violation of trust and confidence.” 
In the case before the CCMA, Mr Hlebela did not give “reasonable assistance” to explain to Western Platinum, in 
fact, he gave “no assistance”. 
These prerequisites for derivative misconduct were clearly articulated by the arbitrator at [29] on p 8 of NUM and 
Others/RSA Geological Services, a division of De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited [2004] 1 BALR 1 (P) as: 
 
“... first, that the employee knew or could have acquired knowledge of the wrongdoing; second, that the employee failed 
without justification to disclose that knowledge to the employer, or to take reasonable steps to help the employer acquire 
that knowledge” (See also: ‘Employment Law’ February 2004 Vol. 20 Part 1 on pages 23 and 24). 
 
The arbitrator accepted that the respondent, on a balance of probabilities, had proven these two “ingredients”. 
The arbitrator made the following award: 
• the dismissal of the applicant, Mr Arnold Hlebela, on the basis of him being guilty of derivative misconduct is 
upheld as procedurally and substantively fair;  
• this frivolous and vexatious application is dismissed; and  
• the CEPPWAWU trade union and the applicant, Mr Arnold Hlebela are ordered to equally (50% + 50%) pay 
the costs incurred by Western Platinum Refinery for the two days that this matter sat before the commissioner 
at the CCMA in Ekurhuleni. Such costs shall be computed at Schedule A of the Magistrate’s court Act, 32 of 
1944 upon presentation of a Bill of Taxation by the respondent, Western Platinum Refinery as provided for in 
CCMA Rule 39(3).  
 
8. Collective Guilt 
 
In principle, the courts require the same standards to be applied in cases of so-called group misconduct as do in cases of 
individual misconduct. However, specific problems arise when a number of employees who were involved in the same act 
of misconduct are subjected to disciplinary action (Grogan; 2001). Employers are sometimes faced with misconduct but 
no evidence to prove it as the witnesses refuse to come forward or to testify. The common law duty to act in good faith 
towards the employer flies out of the window and the employer is faced with the difficult decision as to whether it is going 
to start charging witnesses for failing to report misconduct or to come forward with information and evidence. These 
problems relate to the selection of employees to be disciplined, the situation that arises when there is no direct evidence 
against any or all of the individual employees, and the consistency or otherwise of the sanction applied. 
 
8.1 Selection for discipline 
 
In SA Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union & others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd the Labour Appeal Court upheld the 
dismissals of employees who had taken part in a violent demonstration, even though other workers who had participated 
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in the same offence had been acquitted by a different presiding officer because there was insufficient evidence of their 
involvement. 
This suggests that employees who are guilty of misconduct cannot rely on the “party principle” to escape the 
consequences of their misconduct simply because their employer was unable to gather evidence against other 
employees who were also involved in the same misconduct. The situation is different if the employees can prove that the 
employer was wilfully remiss in obtaining evidence against other guilty employees for ulterior reasons. 
 
8.2 Collective misconduct 
 
When a large or unknown number of employees have engaged in collective misconduct, and the actual perpetrators 
cannot be identified, the employer may be tempted either to select some employees for dismissal as an example to 
others, or to dismiss all employees who could conceivably have been involved, whether innocent or otherwise, in the 
hope that the guilty employees will be caught in the net. The first option is plainly unacceptable the dismissal of the 
selected employees is unfair unless there is evidence to link them to the commission of the offence. Such dismissals will 
be stigmatised as arbitrary. On the face of it, the second option is equally unacceptable, as it appears to offend against 
the principle, endorsed by all civilised legal systems, that it is preferable for a guilty party to go free, than to convict an 
innocent person. 
One way out of this problem is for the employer to rely on the notion of “derivative misconduct”. In Chauke and 
Others v Lee Service Centre CC t/a Leeson Motors (1998) 19 ILJ 1441 (LAC) the court explained derivative misconduct 
as follows: “This approach involved a derived justification, stemming from an employee’s failure to offer reasonable 
assistance in the detection of those actually responsible for the misconduct. Though the dismissal is designed to target 
the perpetrators of the original misconduct, the justification is wide enough to encompass those innocent of it, but who 
through their silence make themselves guilty of a derivative violation of trust and confidence.” Although the principle in 
question causes problems in light of the principle of fairness in our law, Judge of Appeal Cameron formulated two lines of 
justification for a fair dismissal. First is where an employee who is part of a group of perpetrators is under duty to assist 
the employer in bringing the guilty to book. The second is where an employee has or may reasonably be supposed to 
have information concerning the guilty but fails or refuse to disclose same. His or her failure to come forward with the 
information may itself amount to misconduct as the relationship between employer and employee is in its essentials one 
of trust and confidence. 
Although in both cases the courts’ observation were obiter, it seems, however clear that the judgments lay down 
the principle that, in appropriate circumstances, dismissals will be accepted as fair if the employees were aware of the 
identity of the perpetrators of serious misconduct, but declined to disclose this information to their employer after being 
requested to do so. 
In Foschini Group v Maidi & others (2009) 18 LAC 1.25.2; [2010] 7 BLLR 689 (LAC) five employees (the full staff 
compliment in that store) were charged with “failure to secure assets of the company” after substantial stock losses were 
detected at the clothing store where they had been employed. The employer could not prove that they were in fact 
stealing the stock, however they were dismissed in their absence for “Gross negligence by failing to take proper care of 
company property under their control resulting in a financial loss of R 207 000 as well as an irretrievable breakdown in the 
trust relationship. The company conducted a thorough investigation by sending a manager to the store in question, who 
conducted the investigation himself, which preceded and founded his report. 
The Commissioner in the arbitration proceedings (and as confirmed by the LAC) looked at various cases where the 
question of collective misconduct or sanction was considered. According to Professor Grogan in Snip Trading the 
justification for the dismissal of each employee lies in his or her individual culpability for the failure of the group to attain 
the performance standard set by the employer. This justification is permissible if one accepts that an employer is entitled 
to introduce strict rules in order to protect its assets. It is often extremely difficult to prove that stock losses are caused by 
a particular employee. Consequently, it is acceptable for employers to introduce rules into the workplace and employment 
contracts which, if breached carry the sanction of dismissal, even for a first offence, and even if it is not a criminal 
offence. ‘Unauthorized possession’ and ‘failure to follow security procedures’ were examples given by Professor Grogan 
of such offences. These rules are reasonable, he reasoned because ‘rules are assessed not only in terms of fairness, but 
also in terms of operational requirements.’ Consequently, it is acceptable for employers to introduce rules into the 
workplace and employment contracts which, if breached carry the sanction of dismissal, even for a first offence, and even 
if it is not a criminal offence. It should be noted therefore that the principle is not that some (the innocent) must suffer 
because the employer cannot pin point the guilty. In this case, all are held responsible for not complying with the rule and 
not acting in good faith in executing their duties. It therefore lies in each employee’s individual culpability for the failure of 
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the group to attain the performance standard set by the employer (Le Roux; 2011). 
In RSA Geological services v Grogan NO & others the court revisited the concept of derivative misconduct in 
circumstances where the employer had established a prima facie that all employees in its employ had either been 
involved in misconduct or were aware of it, but could not identify the actual perpetrators. The court held that the onus was 
then on the employees to rebut the facts and inferences and that when they failed to do so it must find that all probably 
knew of the misconduct and participated in it, and that their dismissals were fair. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
If employees possess information that would enable their employer to identify wrongdoer and those employees that fail to 
come forward when asked to do so, they violate the trust upon which the employment relationship is founded. The 
violation of that trust may justify dismissal in appropriate circumstances. This breach of the employee’s common law duty 
of good faith has acquired the label of “derivative Misconduct” (Wallis labour and employment law, 1992). In order to be 
successful in a case of derivative misconduct, the employer will have to convince the presiding officer that two elements 
are present. 
First that the employee knew or could have acquired knowledge of the wrongdoing and second that the employee 
failed without justification to disclose that knowledge to the employer, or to take reasonable steps to help the employer 
acquire that knowledge.(Employment Law February 2004 vol 20 part 1 p 23-24. 
Finally the constitutional court in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and others 2008 (2) BCLR 
158 (CC) confirm that the ultimate test that a commissioner must apply in a case is one of fairness. The commissioner’s 
sense of fairness must prevail and not the employer’s view. Therefore the commissioner will take into account the totality 
of circumstances. The commissioner must consider the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal, as he or 
she must take into account the basis of the employee’s challenge to the dismissal. 
The approach involved a derived justification, stemming from an employee’s failure to offer reasonable assistance 
in the detection of those actually responsible for the misconduct. The justification is wide enough to encompass also 
those innocent of it, and make themselves guilty of a derivative violation of trust and confidence. Justice must not only be 
done but it must be seen to be done. 
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